No. 12

Experience of something real.

Something systematic for the disclosure of the horizons:

<The structure of the total “memory”- horizon>[[1]](#footnote-1)

*<Content:> Something universal concerning the theory of experience of something “real”. Systematic exhibition and disclosure of the horizons up to spatio-temporality as formal basic structure, that is, for the real in necessary configuration of something real, of substrate structure, etc. (continuation within the collection of these months)[[2]](#footnote-2)Starting point of the systematic way for the interpretation of the pre-given world and its constitution.*

<§1. Thing-experience as unanimous substrate-experience.

“Smooth identification”, and first identity of the substrate>

Experience is self-presentation, giving of something itself. Things, like existing objects as such, have their modes of self-presentation. By simply talking about the thing’s self-presentation we mean undisputed self-presentation. The dispute is connected with the self-presentation’s being an “apperception” with differences between the properly perceived and the ad-perceived of the presented. Thereto the further more closer explications.

Each thing-meaning that is not actual experience, self-presentation thus, according to “what” it means points back to perception, in which, if it is experiencing perception, the thing shows itself, and <which>, if it [the perception] is mere intuitional illustration of the thing that remains undecided as to being and not-being, and therefore is [intuitional illustration] of all its properties thereby undecided as to being and not-being, is a modification of experience, an experience “as if”: not what the thing is like as itself, but what it would be like according to its being-self, if it presented itself. The intuitional illustration is **[106]** simply no actual intuition, no actual self-presentation, in which the thing faces me as itself, shows itself to me.

The thing shows itself, but my single beginning and ending, thus finite experience of the thing is not consciousness in which the thing makes a perfect and thereby ultimately valid appearance. The **horizon of apperception** does not only mean that a part of the thing-determinations is not yet self-given, but at the same time [it means] that it still depends on the horizonlike anticipated, or rather, [it depends] on the fulfilling self-presentation, whether the self-presented presents something itself, whereby and wherein the thing presents itself as itself. This leads towards the possibilities of verification as extension of experience, as making of a unitary experience in which the initially finite experience can synthetically adjunct itself to ever farther stretches of experience, with which ever new anticipated elements become self-given, and [they become self-given] in such a way that thereby the thing presents itself with an ever richer content, and an already presented thing, insofar as together with the appertinent anticipation it actually something is presenting, [as it] confirms its certainty of being.

The self of the being thing or the actual self-being with the respective this-content that makes something being concretely a This, with the sense “this thing”, thus is exclusively actualized within the self-presentation in levels of relative perfection, or rather restriction. This implies: By having an original belief in existence, by experiencing, I expect – this is implied within the ever and necessarily anticipating certainty of being – that future experience could enlarge the giving of something itself. On the other hand and in contrary direction: I am familiar with the fact that when I so to say keep the experience and experience something else, like in a practical occupation otherwise directed, I do not lose the former experience according to restorable sense and acceptance of being, that by way of recollection and thereby through an intuitive “re”-call I could again take up the experiencing and [could] possibly continue [the experiencing] as original perceiving, and [I could] thus verify [it] in its former intention and by way of verifying enlarge [it].

How is this to be understood? Initially we have to complete the previously said. If we proceed from a finite stretch of experience to a new one that connects itself to the former in a synthetic-unanimous way, **[107]** then the identical being becomes conscious on every stretch in itself, and on the new stretch as continuation of the old one, and on the combined whole stretch that <reaches> from the beginning-phase of the first – we could say <from the> first experience that already is experience of the same – up to the last experience of the second. And thus again and again in the course of the stretch. Does it suffice to remain in the previous empty universality, and to simply say – however true this is -, that what is actually given in each experience changes into mere appearance in the further course, or – if we talk about situations and take each as a field of sometimes passively, sometimes actively channeled experience in which true actuality and illusion can be distinguished – <to say> that each situationally true being was characterized as appearance in the course towards new situations? This is crude, and not even completely correct, because the situations are thereby already thought of in a sequence of levels according to which the within the order later situation interest in a greater accuracy was interested in a more perfect truth than the former one. Can we cope with empty universalities, and do we not have to study the stream of world experience more closely and according to a universality structure that brings out the essential form of the unitary performance in the constant extension of the finite experience and the way the enlarging of the experience within the and-so-forth into experience *in infinitum*, arising as a result for each finiteness, conducted in the essential form of the extension and resulted in an essential form of infinity?

**Noematic-ontic explication**. Each experienced of an experience points to possible further experience or [further experience] lying within one’s ability, to be produced arbitrarily in a manner of speaking, in which more of the experienced, the same experienced, becomes visible, and on the other hand [it points] to those further experiences lying within one’s ability (or else possibly occurring on their own accord), in which what has already been experienced is experienced as the same anew, in a new way. We have in mind here as experiencing a continuous, active experiencing, that is of such a kind that as being continuously “unbroken”, unmodalized [experiencing], does not break in the way of the doubt or of the cancellation of being (negation, consciousness that what has just been identical as certain of being was an “illusion”). And within such “**unanimous**” experiencing the designated structure of continuous identification is implied, the **[108]** identical something’s consciousness of the certainty of being, of the one that presents itself therein (originally there); and when the unitary consciousness breaks it can restore itself through “correction”, through substitution of the “vane illusion”, through the being that is to be experienced in its place, or rather, the experienced being, inserting itself as that into the unitary whole experiencing of the corrected form.

As to the **identical of the unitary experience**, it is constituted as that in a peculiar way: it is an identical something that displays itself as the same in manifold elements of identity, [in] dependent identical things, in which the existing total identical something is, the whole object, in which it is this and that – its being for example “consists” of being red, <of> being within the space, of being-different-and-yet-being-the-same-object. And each such explicating its being is in itself something identical, and as that itself again possibly explicating itself in its explicates (properties, determinations). But now the course of the unitary experience identifying in the certainty of being is of such a kind, we can say, that it has to keep up in an identifying way the objective elements, in which the “concrete” object (the concrete substrate) is the same, over some stretch (at least in detail), but that it still does not offhand keep it identical in simplicity. In the further course the evenly red becomes a stained red; the stained red does not emerge through mere explication of the continuously evenly red color, but in the way of the instead-of-this-moreover-otherwise: instead of a continuous extension of red an extension in distinctions that pierce through the continuous being. The evenly experienced red color in itself is not stained, therefore it was impossible to describe it as that in the case of the purely describing expression. But still it is understood that: The substrate object that heretofore appeared to be evenly red is, according to continued experience stained red in truth. The red color is in this substrate experience – of the experienced spatial thing – not simply an experienced object, not itself an experiential substrate, but an experiential explicate; it is experienced in such a way that the substrate “explicates” itself therein as being thus. And as such a “property” it is in truth different from the way it had presented itself heretofore and truly. Its own being is not being a property **[109]**, as if as red-experience-unity it was the property “red” determining the thing. How does continued experience effect that whereby the thing in the example explicated itself in its identical self-being – and this it did by way of experience, within the evenly red color that shows itself through self-identification -, should suddenly not belong to it, and instead something else? How can it then remain the same thing, which being the same as experience, can only be the same within the identically experienced explicate? Our question is not in what way a thing, the being of which is presupposed, and no matter for what reason, is verified (like each other can assure himself of it, also where we do not experience it, and however our experiencing may be qualitied), may be grasped by our experiencing in a good or bad way in its actual qualities, but our question is, what lies within our, within my experiencing itself, how it achieves the identification within itself as an experiencing identifying in the designated change emerging in itself (that is a modalization, a cancellation, and correcting cancellation repeating itself).

For a (noematic-ontic) clarification we need to start from cases of the substrate object’s unchanging. Since it will be acceptable that a change points back to unchanging in its experienceability, that originally it only receives an experiential sense as change of something unchanged, that in order to gain this sense, this implies that a change can also become an unchanging in every current phase. Let us thus consider any exemplary object, that is, a spatial thing that is experienced without changing itself.

Supposed – however this may pose problems for deeper analyses, problems of understandability – the thing was already experienced as a thing, as a **substrate**, as something that can be explicated, or rather, that gradually explicates itself in is explicates – thereto a certain unanimity of experience as experience of the substrate identical belongs within the remaining identical of the singly advancing explicates -, then the substrate is necessarily already during the insertion apperceived in such a way, that it implies in advance (in the intentional form of anticipation) the possibility, or rather, the facultative possibility of explication, an anticipation which fulfills itself, simply **[110]** within the gradual continuous anticipating and fulfilling experiencing of that wherein the identifying substrate shows its self-being, namely shows [its self-being] within the special properties.

Obviously the first and most original showing-itself-thus is the stretch of identification that so to say lets prevail smooth identification within the properties, namely without property modalization (in the mode of the “properly not thus but otherwise”). I can repeatedly experience this **first identity of the substrate** in its simple identity elements in our case of a thing experienced in an unchanged way, simply repeatedly explicating the same in its samenesses. What I see and faithfully explicate there has its own doubtless certainty. It belongs to this experience in its free repeatability, for me and for everyone who likes to repeat it, this way of experience.

But experience goes further, we suppose, and not only in the way of simply continuing explication of the already at the beginning anticipated in an not explicated experiencing way. The property elements in their own experiential content change. Any kind of change (not the change of a real thing here but change of the “content “red””, that in itself is not a thing) has to fulfill essential conditions as content of the experience. “Red” cannot change into “sour”. Color can only change into color and not into taste or pitch, etc. To each change belongs a continuity of similarity, that is fused to a concrete continuum within the continuity of the experiencing’s time. If the change is volatile it still presupposes a ground of continuity of similarity that bridges the leap. Such continuity constitutes *eo ipso* a certain identity, thus the identity of the color changing “itself”, of the same, that is in each phase of the temporal stretch that is fulfilled by ever other but similar data, simply sometimes in this, sometimes in that condition of change. (The borderline case for such a unity of fusion or “concrete” unity is the unchanging, the remaining the same in all phases.)

If now red, the smell, etc., are apperceived in the experiencing apperception as properties of the experienced real thing, it seems to be a matter of course that, in the case <that> the one or the other property is given as a changing one within the experiencing explication, now also the thing is experienced as changing itself, that is, as changing itself with regard **[111]** to this property. How do we, experiencing the thing, get round to still experiencing it as an unchanged thing, and to attribute the sense to the change: “The thing appeared to be evenly red, but now I see it as stained red”? Maybe we initially say: Now I see that it is stained in truth. But if the experience goes on, that stained coloring, that I explicate and describe in this and that way, may change again, and thus it is an open possibility in ever new continuing experiences of the same thing, and of course with regard to all respectively experienced properties, and these taken in the way that they are actually experienced. How can the substrate then be identified, and in the evidence of the experience **with the sense “unchanged thing”**? And where are the unchanged experiential properties that it demands as such? It is *de facto* experienced in the transiency of properties, as of those <in which it is> what it respectively is; and if these change, it is simply always different and not the same, unless the same changing itself.

If we now reconsider the **repeatability** essentially belonging to the experience of unchanged being, and the possibility that also such changes have to come back in the unity of the repeating combination of experiential processes, or rather must be able to be brought to return in free option. If we add that in the experience of a thing this [thing] is (essentially) apperceived in advance according to these repeatabilities and their iterations: that is, apperceived as something identical that can be explicated, that shows itself with its elements of identity (properties) within the explication that possibly proceeds in an active way, but that it will then happen in the course of experience, and it anyway is an open possibility, that in the re-experience of the already experienced properties not an experience merely repeating itself takes place, insofar as these [experienced properties] show a changed content now, and thus reiterably an ever new one. **[112]**

<§2. The multi-dimensional horizon structure of the experience of a physical thing>

From the first moment each experience of a physical thing is a continuous perception of the thing and thus in continuous change, and this implies that it has a range that stretches far beyond what is currently given. Its experiencing meaning has an **open horizon of possible experiences of the same thing**, in which everything that has not been properly given by it would arrive at proper givenness. They are not intuitionally-represented experiences currently hovering in advance, and now even singly particularized [experiences]. Still it is a horizon of consciousness, a mode of <the> **implicitly meaning beyond the properly experienced**, [a mode] of an “not intuitable”, “vague” [meaning beyond], that proves itself as meaning beyond in its meant sense within the possibly freely <produced>, or certain actual or possible experiences emerging on their own accord, and with the evidence that they were embraced within the undetermined universality in an own way, that is, in a vague, not intuitable, undifferentiated way, but still meant along.

It is shown in such uncovering that the **horizon** has a respective **structure**, an **ordinal form of immediacy and mediacy of the implication of experiences and the content of experiences**, following which <one> is able to gain the evidence of a multidimensional facultative possibility for ever new experiences, experiencing something new of the same thing, and thus eventually gains the evidence of an infinity, that is, of a multidimensional and integrally self-contained [infinity]. It can be made evident from each actual experience what it **attributes** (ad-perceives) as **apperception** of this thing, that actually comes to sight with its *hic et nunc* so to say, and certainly is attributed to it. Indicated more closely, this happens, by way of representing intuitions of the mode “possible experience”, not merely <through> fantasies, fictions removed from the acceptance of being as co-acceptance of this thing’s being, but <through> representations that have a co-acceptance as “possible experiences”, although in a modification only incompletely indicated by the word “possible”. What comes to light in the course of actual experience, and thus **[113]** already from the first experiential phase on, with which the thing is already plainly experienced, [with which the thing] comes actually and ever anew to light with physical content of its own in the certainty of being, evidently **belongs to the horizon** as regarding the content initially in a not intuited way and still ambiguously, then determinately predelineating, indicating in advance, and then fulfilling-proving this indicating in advance by way of respective determined self-givenness. A standing out indicating in advance and actualization takes place in this course ever again anew; it is a continuous entering, preconception and eventually viewing into the horizon, and [viewing] of that lying within the horizon – becoming visible in this way as the determinately existent actuality. But the meaning-in-advance, the anticipating, <which> accompanies the experiencing in a sense-bestowing way, always exceeds the next, and anticipates in advance those anticipations just in future standing out with their fore-meant contents. **The horizon implication continually implies in advance mediacies of the implication**, and thereby is in its vagueness an undetermined, **endlessly ambiguous** [implication] implying infinities of disjunctive possibilities in its indeterminacy in the way of disjunctive leaving open. And thereby it implies in advance a certain **plural-dimension** in the structure of its sense-giving that leaves open multiple possible ways of the execution of certain experiences <and> of the experiential syntheses. I, the de facto experiencing, can conceive what possible experiential directions and experiences are included within the horizon of the respective de facto experience as a systematic connection of representing intuitions as my experiences possible from there and courses of experiences, and [I can] thereby become certain at last of the systematic totality. If I proceed from my experience it has as my [experience] already its horizon of determinately directed preliminary indications, or rather subsequent interpretations; beyond that what is properly perceived it has its horizon of recollection I can let myself in for by initially changing in a volatile way the vaguely awakened memories into re-intuitions, and by following them within the intuitability of the “again” with each actually experienced within the former, by combining the developing stretches of recollection, etc.

**[114]** Likewise each experience (perception) has its **horizon of future preliminary indication**, namely of the next expectational, and from there mediately to be expected with respective facultative possibilities of intuition (pre-figuration, intuitive “anticipation” as analogue of recollection). Again a **horizon of the immediate and mediate co-present** of the same experiential object, not perceptually present in a proper way, [not] properly perceived, but apperceived – cognizable as a mode of memory to be distinguished from recollection and anticipation. All in all a **“memory”- horizon in an enlarged sense**, as a horizon of a certain predelineation in the mode of certainty (whereby of course the certainty can modalize <itself> in the course of experience). But beforehand the experience as such, with the sense to present a real object as itself present, is equipped in this regard with a multi-dimensional horizon reaching far beyond all that; this [horizon] exceeds, as we will see straight away, the presented real, expanding itself through the real not being experienced and experienceable in an isolated way, but within a whole of experience that brings to presentation a multiplicity of objects, we would better say, a respective **configuration of realities**. Each has respectively its own memory horizon, but which, combined with the [horizon] of the other ones, constitutes the horizon of total experience, as total memory horizon of the same. **Each single perception of something real is a piece of a perceptional field with its configuration of single realities** as presented now. But essentially the perceptional field is flowing, and within the flowing changing-itself it carries – in a flowing way – continuously a recollection horizon as the vital horizon of the former perceptional fields’ continuity still conscious in the mode “just past and ever further past”, in the contrary direction a corresponding horizon co-changing itself in its mode within the flowing, [a horizon] of the now immediately and continuously mediately becoming visible perceptional fields (the **protentional horizon**), and again: the horizon of the **adpresented further surroundings** belonging to the concrete perceptional field as present field of the properly perceived realities as next appresented configuration of realities which would have become actually present now through appropriately **[115]** changed ways of perception that formerly have been taken de facto, and which, on freely possible change of the current course, would prove themselves through the expectational and actualized future as current anticipation of the co-present.

But on entering the horizon of the co-present we will straight away be urged on towards the **further horizon structure**.

What we bring to a first rough explication while pursuing it obviously is the **way that experience** (as indissoluble fusion of perception and apperception)makes conscious **something real as experiential** **sense** and then with the sense of the spatiotemporal being **in the way of the self-givenness**.[[3]](#footnote-3) The same holds true for the respective perception that gives something original (as self-there) in that way, and for the horizonedness indissoluble from it, implied in it with the corresponding different modes of variants from the perception, that on the one hand are memory certainties in the first sense (enclosed expectation certainties and certainties of current co-existing things), but on the other hand include further variants which the vague expression “possible experience”, “possible recollection”, “<possible> anticipation”, etc. indicates[[4]](#footnote-4).

Something real is apperceived in such a way, that - considered in and of itself – it <is> partly properly perceived, partly apperceived, whereby exclusively contentual components of the real itself are in sight. It has **its** spatiotemporality as something spatiotemporally experienced, that is, **its** spatial present as persisting, although changeable spatial shape, as coexistential form (configuration form) for its qualities localized through it and within it (that are spread, extended in a space-filling way over the spatial shape on the lowest level). Furthermore, as form of the change with the borderline case of unchanging this real thing’s own duration, the continuum of its temporal locus, in which the phases of the spatial shape of the real and thereby of the persisting current being of the real taken in a concrete way **[116]** are temporally localized. Duration as duration, in which the shape, and thereby the respective currently co-existing endures, that is concretely localized as something persisting in the shape thus as united form is the spatio-temporality peculiar to the real; The horizons that own essentially belong to it relate to it in their unity. But each real thing is **beforehand apperceived as something real within the all-encompassing spatio-temporality**, and thereby as something real of the integrally self-contained **real world**; it is simply a universe – an all-inclusive unity of realities. Its perceptive-apperceptive mode of givenness is indissoluble from the [mode] of the real thing that is perceptively-apperceptively experienced as this-there, namely by way of the necessity to belong to its perceptual field.

If we consider a single real thing in exclusive consideration, purely turned towards its being itself , then we have no other space than **its** space as **its** shape localizing its whole respective being present and extending according to the immediate, and thus, more concretely spoken, spatio-temporally its spatio-temporal, persistently changeable shape within the unity of duration. We find only the deformation’s form of alteration and the corresponding modes of change of the localized, or rather, space-filling qualities as **own essential** here. But we do not find <as own essential> the motion’s mode of alteration. It is motion within “the” space, <within> the spatiality encompassing the respective single spatial thing. The <spatiality> of the simultaneously perceptual configurative plurality is the first of this spatiality reaching beyond the real shape within the current experience, that is, [the spatiality] of the **unitary perceptual field**. This plurality as plurality has simply a configuration, has for its part a unitary shape in which the single shapes of the simultaneously presented realities have their form of simultaneous co-existence. Each is within this “space”, namely each is **shaped into** it with its special shape. And here the conspicuous **change of configuration** **as such** makes an appearance as plural form of change, that states for the members of the same as its part: changes of the “relative” layers, of the being oriented against each other, and this is motion. Only where a single thing, apperceived as a thing has a configurative memberedness in itself, where thus a configurative plurality is apperceived as persisting **[117]** unity, and is presented actually as that, thus is “seen” as a thing with members, there also motion emerges as belonging to it in an own essential way within the presented single thing: the motion of the members against each other.

Thereby can be seen at the same time that it is important within <the> clarification of the sense of the experienced real things to initially go back in an abstractive way to the basic case of presentation of inarticulate realities, like in another regard to the basic case of unchanging prior to all change: and this of course within the frame of actual experience.

1. From May, June 1932 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. This „continuation“ may be text no. 9 of the present volume – editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The spatio-temporality is the basic structure of all worldly-real experienced and to be experienced. But spatiality is the spatial shape for the single real thing, and this is the basis for everything else that is determining for the real. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Husserl annotates to this sentence in the margin: „unintelligible“. – Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)